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Abstract. Flood disaster mitigation strategies should be
based on a comprehensive assessment of the flood risk com-
bined with a thorough investigation of the uncertainties asso-
ciated with the risk assessment procedure. Within the “Ger-
man Research Network of Natural Disasters” (DFNK) the
working group “Flood Risk Analysis” investigated the flood
process chain from precipitation, runoff generation and con-
centration in the catchment, flood routing in the river net-
work, possible failure of flood protection measures, inunda-
tion to economic damage. The working group represented
each of these processes by deterministic, spatially distributed
models at different scales. While these models provide the
necessary understanding of the flood process chain, they are
not suitable for risk and uncertainty analyses due to their
complex nature and high CPU-time demand. We have there-
fore developed a stochastic flood risk model consisting of
simplified model components associated with the compo-
nents of the process chain. We parameterised these model
components based on the results of the complex determinis-
tic models and used them for the risk and uncertainty analysis
in a Monte Carlo framework. The Monte Carlo framework
is hierarchically structured in two layers representing two
different sources of uncertainty, aleatory uncertainty (due to
natural and anthropogenic variability) and epistemic uncer-
tainty (due to incomplete knowledge of the system). The
model allows us to calculate probabilities of occurrence for
events of different magnitudes along with the expected eco-
nomic damage in a target area in the first layer of the Monte
Carlo framework, i.e. to assess the economic risks, and to de-
rive uncertainty bounds associated with these risks in the sec-
ond layer. It is also possible to identify the contributions of
individual sources of uncertainty to the overall uncertainty.
It could be shown that the uncertainty caused by epistemic
sources significantly alters the results obtained with aleatory
uncertainty alone. The model was applied to reaches of the
river Rhine downstream of Cologne.
Correspondence to: H. Apel
(hapel@gfz-potsdam.de)
1 Introduction
Flood defence systems are usually designed by specifying an
exceedance probability and by demonstrating that the flood
defence system prevents damage from events corresponding
to this exceedance probability. This concept is limited by a
number of assumptions and many researchers have called for
more comprehensive design procedures (Plate, 1992; Bowles
et al., 1996; Berga, 1998; Vrijling, 2001). The most complete
approach is the risk-based design approach which balances
benefits and costs of the design in an explicit manner (Stew-
art and Melchers, 1997). In the context of risk-based design,
the flood risk consists of the flood hazard (i.e. extreme events
and associated probability) and the consequences of flooding
(i.e. property damages). Ideally, a flood risk analysis should
take into account all relevant flooding scenarios, their associ-
ated probabilities and possible damages as well as a thorough
investigation of the uncertainties associated with the risk ana-
lysis. Thus, a flood risk analysis should finally yield a risk
curve, i.e. the full distribution function of the flood damages
in the area under consideration, ideally accompanied by un-
certainty bounds.
Following these concepts the working group “Flood Risk
Analysis” of the German Research Network on Natural dis-
asters (DFNK) investigated the complete flood disaster chain
from the triggering event to its consequences: “hydrolog-
ical load – flood routing – potential failure of flood pro-
tection structures – inundation – property damage”. For
each element, complex, spatially distributed models were
applied, representing the meteorological, hydrological, hy-
draulic, geo-technical, and socio-economic processes (Men-
zel et al., 2004; Disse et al., 2004; Holz and Merting, 2004;
Grothmann and Reusswig, 2004). These complex models
were complemented by a simple stochastic model consist-
ing of modules each representing one process of the flood
disaster chain. Each module is a simple parameterisation of
the corresponding more complex deterministic model, where
the parameterisations and parameters are calibrated against
the data and results of the corresponding complex models.
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Table 1. Sources of uncertainty in the model system separated into aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Sources printed in plain bold face
are considered in the Monte-Carlo-Framework for the risk and uncertainty analysis. Sources in italic bold face are considered in scenario
calculations.
Modules Variability Incomplete knowledge
(aleatory uncertainty) (epistemic uncertainty)
Extreme Value Statistics – annual maximum discharge – measurement errors
– Plotting Positions formulae
– selection of data and partial series
– selection of distribution function of annual maximum discharge
– sampling uncertainty of annual maximum discharge
– parameter estimation for distribution functions
Routing – changes in river channel over time – parameter estimations
– error in model selection
Stage-discharge-relation – hysteresis during a flood wave – measurement error
– changes in river channel over time – parameter estimation
– error in model selection
Levee failure – spatial variation of levee geometry – measurement errors of levee geometry
– substrate distribution – variability estimations of levee parameters (geometry, substrate,
breach width, turf)
– dimension of levee breaches
– turf quality of levee cover
Tributaries – correlation main river – tributaries – extent of correlation, measurement error
Damage estimation – building use and value – method of assessing values of buildings and contents
– spatiotemporal course of inundation – error in damage model selection
in the polder – parameter estimation (e.g. stage-damage curves)
This ensures that the two approaches (simple probabilistic
and complex deterministic) are compatible at all steps of the
process chain.
The advantages of the simple approach are numerous.
First, significantly less CPU time is needed which allows ap-
plication of the approach in Monte Carlo simulations. Sec-
ond, the simple approach involves fewer parameters, so pa-
rameter estimation is more straightforward and robust. Third,
the simpler model structure makes it easier for the analyst to
understand the main controls of the systems. However, these
advantages come at the expense of omitting some of the sub-
tleties of the flood disaster chain.
The simple stochastic model represents two fundamentally
different types of uncertainty, aleatory and epistemic uncer-
tainty. Aleatory uncertainty refers to quantities that are inher-
ently variable over time, space, or populations of individuals
or objects. According to Hall (2003) it can be operationally
defined as being a feature of populations of measurements
that conform well to a probabilistic model. Epistemic un-
certainty results from incomplete knowledge of the object
of investigation and is related to our ability to understand,
measure, and describe the system under study. Aleatory
uncertainty has also been termed variability, objective un-
certainty, stochastic uncertainty, stochastic variability, inher-
ent variability, randomness and type-A uncertainty. Terms
for epistemic uncertainty are subjective uncertainty, lack-
of-knowledge or limited knowledge uncertainty, ignorance,
specification error and type-B uncertainty (Morgan and Hen-
rion, 1990; Plate, 1992, 1993a; Hoffmann and Hammonds,
1994; NRC, 1995, 2000; Ferson and Ginzburg, 1996; Zio and
Apostolakis, 1996; Haimes, 1998; Cullen and Frey, 1999;
van Asselt and Rotmans, 2002).
The simple stochastic model allows the risk and uncer-
tainty analysis through a Monte Carlo framework. In line
with the distinction of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties,
the Monte Carlo framework has been hierarchically struc-
tured, with each of the two layers representing one of the
two types of uncertainties (two-dimensional or second-order
Monte Carlo simulation, Cullen and Frey, 1999). The first
layer represents aleatory uncertainty and assumes that the
variability of the system is perfectly known and correctly
quantified, e.g. by known parameter distributions. The result
of this first layer of Monte Carlo simulation is a risk curve for
the target area. The second layer of Monte Carlo simulations
represents the uncertainty caused by our incomplete knowl-
edge of the system. The extent of the knowledge may range
from some knowledge about the type of variability where ab-
solute figures are unknown, to a complete lack of knowledge
on parts of the system.
This distinction into the two uncertainty classes has
important implication for the results of the risk assessment.
The uncertainty bounds derived by this method cannot be
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interpreted as steady-state and may narrow down as more
knowledge about the processes and parameters under of the
model is obtained. This is because epistemic uncertainty can
certainly be decreased by an increase in knowledge, while
aleatory uncertainty is inherent to the system and cannot be
reduced by more detailed information (Ferson and Ginzberg,
1996).
However, the feasibility of separating aleatory and epis-
temic uncertainty and the use of second-order Monte Carlo-
simulations are subject of an ongoing debate within the sci-
entific community. While there are several risk analysis stud-
ies using or recommending it (Hoffmann and Helton, 1994;
Cohen et al., 1996; USEPA, 1997; Cullen and Frey, 1999),
others challenge the suitability of probability theory for deal-
ing with epistemic uncertainty (Ferson and Ginzburg, 1996;
Hall et al., 1998; Hall, 2003). They argue that evidence the-
ory (Shafer, 1987) provides a more adequate approach. (A
good review of these two types of uncertainty and of mathe-
matical treatment is given in the special issue of the Journal
of Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety, Helton and
Burmaster, 1996).
Identifying the uncertainty sources and assigning them to
the two classes may be difficult as in some cases a clear dis-
tinction between natural variability and lack-of-knowledge is
unclear because of our incomplete understanding of the sys-
tem. Table 1 lists the uncertainty sources we deemed rele-
vant for our proposed risk assessment methodology. How-
ever, in this case study we incorporated only some uncer-
tainty sources to exemplify the approach. As other studies
indicate, the major uncertainty source in flood risk assess-
ment has to be expected in the extreme value statistics (Merz
et al., 2002). Consequently the uncertainty analysis has its
main focus on this part of the modelling system. Further
considered uncertainty sources are those associated with the
levee failure module, the correlation of the main river and
tributaries, the damage estimation and the stage-discharge-
relation (rating curve). They are printed in bold in Table 1.
The other listed sources of uncertainty are excluded in this
study.
However, because of the dominance of the extreme value
statistics in the uncertainty analysis the exclusion of most of
these sources is justifiable, i.e. they are of low importance
as opposed to the large uncertainties caused by the extreme
value statistics (see Sect. 5). Also, the uncertainties that may
result from the use of the simple statistical models instead of
the complex models are not considered. Due to the fact that
the simple models are calibrated against the complex model
results the errors are minimised and hence neglectable. Disse
et al. (2004) illustrate the calibration and the model deviation
in case of polder inundation and outflow through the levee
breach.
In this paper, the feasibility of this modelling approach
combined with the hierarchical uncertainty analysis is illus-
trated for a reach of the river Rhine in Germany.
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Fig. 1. Schematic layout of the reaches of the Rhine investigated in
this paper.
1.1 Investigation area
As a target area, the reach of the Rhine between Cologne
and Rees was selected with a focus on the polder at Mehrum
(Fig. 1). The polder at Mehrum is a confined rural area of
12.5 km2, which is only inundated if the protecting levee sys-
tem fails.
The model considers the following elements of the flood
disaster chain: hydrological load, flood routing between the
gauges Cologne and Rees, tributary inflow from the rivers
Ruhr and Lippe, levee performance at two locations (Krefeld,
Mehrum) and damage in the flooded areas of the polder
Mehrum (Fig. 1).
The two levee breach locations selected for the simulation
differ significantly in their storing capacity. At Krefeld the
large unbounded hinterland provides a retention basin with
a practically infinite retention capacity whereas the polder
at Mehrum is strictly confined to a comparatively small vol-
ume. The levees at the two breach locations are similar, but
at Mehrum the levee crest is higher, i.e. larger flood waves
are required to overtop the levee at Mehrum as compared to
Krefeld.
2 Modules
The risk analysis for the flood disaster chain is based on the
following modules:
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Fig. 2. Different distribution functions fitted to the annual maxi-
mum flood series 1961–1995 of the gauge Cologne/Rhine.
• Hydrological load
• Flood routing
• Levee failure and outflow through levee breach
• Damage estimation
Both for the risk and the uncertainty analyses, these mod-
ules are embedded in a Monte Carlo framework (MC-
framework). The following sections describe the modules
briefly, followed by an extensive description of the MC-
framework in Sect. 3. More details are given in Apel et
al. (2004).
2.1 Hydrological load
The hydrological load was derived from the flood frequency
curve of the gauge Cologne/Rhine based on the annual max-
imum series from 1961 to 1995 (AMS 1961–1995). Four
distribution functions were fitted to the AMS 1961–1995:
Gumbel, Lognormal, Weibull and the Pearson-III distribu-
tion. The four distribution functions were weighted by a
Maximum Likelihood method to construct a composite prob-
ability distribution function f (Wood and Rodrı´guez-Iturbe,
1975):
This method gave the following weights θi for the individual
distributions and AMS 1961–1995:
Gumbel: θ1 = 0.0743
Lognormal: θ2 = 0.1525
Weibull: θ3 = 0.3270
Pearson III: θ4 = 0.4462
Figure 2 shows the four individual distributions and the
composite distribution as well as their agreement with the
empirical exceedance probabilities of the observed data
(AMS 1961–1995) which were estimated by Weibull plotting
positions. For extreme discharges the composite distribution
function approximates a mean function of all distributions.
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Fig. 3. Non-dimensional clustered hydrographs of direct runoff
from 35 annual maximum events at the gauge Cologne (Rhine)
(AMS 1961–1995).
In order to determine the occurrence of the levee breaches
and the inundation levels of the polders it was necessary to
generate flood hydrographs in addition to the maximum dis-
charge. Hence typical flood hydrographs were generated for
the gauge Cologne based on non-dimensional hydrographs
in combination with cluster analysis. For each flood event of
the series AMS 1961–1995 a non-dimensional hydrograph
representing direct runoff was calculated as follows (Dyck
and Peschke, 1995):
– Baseflow QB was separated from total observed runoff
Q assuming a linear baseflow hydrograph between the
beginning and the end of direct runoff.
– The direct peak flowQDmax and the time to peak tQDmax
were determined.
– The hydrograph of the direct runoffQD was normalised
by
QDnorm = QD/QDmax (direct runoff) (1)
tnorm = t/tQDmax (time) (2)
so that the scaled direct peak flow is unity at time 1.
The non-dimensional hydrographs of direct runoff of the
AMS 1961–1995 were finally scaled to a consistent duration
of tnorm = 10 and then clustered using the “Average Linkage
between Groups” algorithm and Euclidian distances.
The results of this cluster analysis are seven types of typ-
ical, realistic hydrographs: single peaked hydrographs and
various multiple peaked hydrographs (Fig. 3). Table 2 sum-
marises the characteristics of these hydrographs, which are
the mean values from the rescaled dimensional hydrographs
belonging to each cluster. Within the Monte Carlo frame-
work (see Sect. 3) the non-dimensional hydrographs were
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Table 2. Mean parameters (peak flow, time to peak, baseflow) of direct runoff hydrographs for each cluster at stream gauge Cologne (Rhine).
Hydrograph Probability Peak flow Time to peak Flood duration Initial baseflow Final baseflow
QDmax tQDmax t QBi QBf
( ) (m3/s) (h) (h) (m3/s) (m3/s)
1 0.086 4750.0 152 864 1399 2100
2 0.057 5730.0 324 1044 1535 2150
3 0.028 7600.0 192 840 1270 1990
4 0.028 7290.0 144 840 2480 2680
5 0.200 7190.0 716 1145 1492 2163
6 0.086 7063.3 512 992 1997 2590
7 0.515 6420.6 257 726 1649 2072
rescaled using the flood frequency statistics at Cologne and
the parameters in Table 2.
Since the major tributaries of the selected reach, Lippe and
Ruhr, were also considered in the model, their maximum dis-
charges and the shape of their hydrographs had to be deter-
mined, too. The peak discharges in the main river (gauge
Cologne, Rhine) and the discharges of the corresponding
events in the tributaries (gauge Schermbeck I (Lippe) and
gauge Hattingen (Ruhr)) in the AMS 1961–1995 are corre-
lated and their relationship is approximately linear (Fig. 4).
Therefore, peak discharges at the tributaries were gener-
ated based on linear regressions and the correlations between
main river and tributaries (cf. Sect. 3). The mean shapes of
the hydrographs in the tributaries were determined for each
cluster in Table 2, i.e. the hydrographs of the tributaries cor-
responding to those at the main river were identified. This
means that the time lags between the peak discharges of the
tributaries and the main river are fixed for each correspond-
ing hydrographs.
2.2 Flood routing
The second module of the flood disaster chain is a routing
module consisting of the Muskingum routing method for
flood waves in river channels (Maidment, 1992). The re-
quired parameters, travel time K and shape parameter m,
were estimated for the defined river reaches from the 35 flood
events of the years 1961–1995, which were simulated using a
1-dimensional, non-stationary hydrodynamic model SOBEK
(Disse et al., 2004). The travel times for the reaches were
calculated as the mean travel times K of the peak discharges
between the gauging stations, whereas the form parameter m
was estimated from the complete flood waves using the Least
Squares method.
2.3 Levee failure
In this case study we defined two levee breach locations and
derived probabilities of breaches for these two points. Hence
the failure probabilities are estimates of levee failure at a cer-
tain point, representing the measurement error of the levee
geometry. The spatial variability of the levee geometry and
the length effect of different long river stretches on the failure
probability are not considered in this study.
For the calculation of the (point-)failure probability of a
levee, a general engineering technique was applied in which
a breach condition is defined as the exceedance of a load fac-
tor over a resistance factor. This concept was applied to levee
failures caused by overtopping of the levee crest which is the
most common failure mechanism of modern zonated levees.
The breach criterion was defined as the difference qD (m3/s)
between the actual overflow qa (m3/s) (the load factor) and
the critical overflow qcrit (m3/s) (the resistance factor):
if qa > qcrit → breach (3)
or
if qD > 0 → breach
For the calculation of qa and qcrit the approaches of Ko-
rtenhaus and Oumeraci (2002) and Vrijling (2000) were
used, respectively. These are based on overtopping height
dh and overflowing time te as independent variables and on
the geometry of the levees. The only non-geometric param-
eter used in this formulae is the turf-quality parameter fg
(Vrijling 2002), which is of subjective nature and hence was
given particular attention in the uncertainty calculations (cf.
Sect. 3).
From this intermediate complex deterministic model a
probabilistic model representing the conditional failure prob-
ability depending on overtopping height and time was de-
rived. In order to calculate the failure probability, the con-
ditional levee failure curves method (USACE, 1999) was ex-
tended in this paper. Since the definition of the failure crite-
rion in Eq. (3) contains two independent variables, dh and te,
it was necessary to construct a conditional failure probabil-
ity surface instead of a one-dimensional failure curve. The
derivation of the conditional failure surface for each breach
location comprises the following steps:
– Describe the epistemic uncertainty of the parameters
in the equations calculating the levee failure criterion
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Fig. 4. Linear regressions between maximum discharge of the
Rhine (gauge Cologne) and maximum discharge of the tributaries
Ruhr (gauge Hattingen) and Lippe (gauge Schermbeck I) of the
corresponding events plotted along with the 95% prediction inter-
vals for annual maximum series AMS 1961–1995 of the Rhine at
gauge Cologne.
qa − qcrit , i.e. estimates of mean values, standard devi-
ations or coefficients of variation and distribution types.
Estimates of these moments can be found in Vrijling
(2000) and were used here.
– Perform a Monte Carlo simulation using a fixed pair of
(dh, te) to calculate the failure criterion. In this step,
104 MC-samples per pair of independent variables were
simulated.
– Calculate the moments of the distribution of the levee
failure criterion for the fixed pair of (dh, te) estimated
by the MC-simulation and identify an appropriate dis-
tribution type.
– Read the probability of exceedance of the breach crite-
rion qa − qcrit = 0 from the cumulative distribution of
the MC-simulation result. This is the failure probability
of the levee for a given overflow height dh after a given
duration te.
– Repeat the procedure for other pairs of (dh, te)
– Construct the failure surface from the failure probabili-
ties of the (dh, te)–tuples.
Figure 5 shows the resulting failure probability surface for
the breach location Krefeld as an example. Because of a lack
of information about the mean, variability and distribution of
the turf quality parameter fg the failure surfaces were calcu-
lated for different fixed values of fg according to the scenar-
ios defined in Sect. 3.
The outflow through a levee breach is calculated from an
empirical outflow formula presented in Disse et al. (2004).
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Fig. 5. Levee failure probability surface for breach location Krefeld
with turf quality parameter fg= 1.05.
This formula is based on the standard weir formula of
Poleni using empirical relationships between the weir co-
efficient and geometric and hydromechanic parameters of
the levee and the river. These relationships were calibrated
for the Lower Rhine at the selected breach locations, using
the 2-dimensional breach outflow simulations performed by
Holz and Merting (2004). From this formula it was possible
to calculate the outflow through a levee breach as a function
of the water levels of river and polder as well as the breach
dimensions. However, for the temporal and spatial breach
development at the two breach locations no functional re-
lationship could be found due to the very complex breach
mechanism and the high variability in the factors influencing
the breach development (Singh, 1996). We therefore treated
the breach dimension as an uncertainty source in the uncer-
tainty analysis.
2.4 Damage estimation
The last module estimates direct monetary losses within the
polder at Mehrum. Flood damage can only occur if the levee
system at Mehrum fails. Since the size and location of the in-
undated areas are not estimated directly by the simple model
presented here, a damage function that relates the damage in
the inundated areas of the polder at Mehrum to the inflow
of water volume after/during a levee failure had to be deter-
mined. This was done by assuming the filling of the polder
in 0.5 m steps up to the levee crest and intersecting each in-
undation layer with the land use map. The damage of the in-
undated land use types was estimated by combining assessed
replacement values and stage-damage curves:
Dsec = AINsec · dsec(h) · V (4)
where:
Dsec: total direct property damage per economic sec-
tor (EUR),
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Table 3. Spatial extent and economic value per sector in the polder at Mehrum.
Economic sector Area in the polder at Mehrum (m2) Replacement value 2000 (EUR/m2)
Private housing 471 100 562
Manufacturing and building industry 4 300 245
Public infrastructure 30 500 467
Energy and water supply 19 700 1785
Traffic and communication engineering 400 41
Buildings in agriculture and forestry 511 000 48
Agricultural area, forest and others 11 653 900 –
Total 12 690 900 –
AINsec: inundated area per economic sector (m2),
dsec(h): average property damage per economic sector as a
function of the inundation depth (–),
vsec: sector-specific replacement value (EUR/m2)
For all sectors, with the exception of private housing, sector-
specific replacement values were determined from the eco-
nomic statistics of North Rhine-Westphalia from 1997 (data
of the gross stock of fixed assets according to the sys-
tem of national accounts from 1958 and land use informa-
tion from the statistical regional authorities in North Rhine-
Westphalia). The replacement values were scaled to the
year 2000 by data on the development of gross stock of fixed
assets in North Rhine-Westphalia (1995: 100; 1997: 102.8;
2000: 108.2) and adjusted to Mehrum by comparing the
gross value added per employee in that region with that of en-
tire North Rhine-Westphalia. Values in the sector of private
housing were assessed by the number of buildings, house-
holds and cars in the target area and their respective average
insured capital in 2000. Appropriate data were provided by
the German Insurance Association. All replacement values
for Mehrum are summarized in Table 3.
The distribution of the economic sectors (industry, pri-
vate housing, infrastructure etc.) within the polder at
Mehrum was given by a land register – the German official
topographic-cartographic information system ATKIS (Ta-
ble 3). This analysis yields a total value of 340×106 EUR for
the assets (buildings and contents) in the polder at Mehrum.
The average property damages per economic sector
dsec(h) depend on the inundation depth. Stage-damage func-
tions were derived in accordance with MURL (2000). Dam-
age was determined per inundated grid cell using Eq. (4).
The total damage of a scenario amounts to the sum of the
damages of all grid cells. The resulting relationship between
inflow volume and property damage in the polder at Mehrum
based on a step-by-step replenishment of the polder is shown
in Fig. 6. With the used stage-damage curves a maximum
damage of 120×106 EUR may occur which amounts to 35%
of the estimated values.
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Fig. 6. Direct property damage within the polder at Mehrum as a
function of the inflow volume after/during a levee failure.
The curves so estimated were compared to damage es-
timates based on space-time patterns of inundation after a
levee failure at Mehrum simulated by Disse et al. (2004).
Figure 6 shows that our results are very similar to those of
the more detailed analysis of Disse et al. (2004).
3 Risk and uncertainty calculation
For the risk and uncertainty analysis a hierarchical Monte
Carlo framework was developed. In the first level of the
analysis the Monte Carlo simulations represent the variabil-
ity of the system, i.e. the aleatory uncertainty. This results in
frequency distributions of floods at the outlet of the investi-
gation area and risk curves for the target area, the polder at
Mehrum. We randomised the following variables in the first
level:
– the annual maximum discharge of the Rhine,
– the correlation of the maximum discharge of the Rhine
with the tributaries Ruhr and Lippe and
The second level of Monte Carlo simulations represents the
uncertainty associated with the results of the first level. In
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Fig. 7. Schematic of the risk and uncertainty calculations.
this level, uncertainty distributions of the flood frequency
distributions and risk curves were calculated and used to con-
struct the confidence bounds.
However, it was not possible to include all uncertainty
sources as for some of them not sufficient information was
available to formulate them in a realistic way. These uncer-
tainty sources include the width of a levee breach after a levee
failure and the turf quality parameter involved in the calcula-
tion of the probability of failure. In these two cases statistics
such as mean values, coefficients of variation and distribu-
tion types were not available. Because of this, the width of
the breach and the turf parameter were not incorporated in the
MC-framework but examined in scenario calculations. The
scenarios apply to both levels of MC-simulations.
3.1 Risk analysis
The 1st level of the MC-simulation was conducted in the fol-
lowing steps: First, a discharge value was randomly chosen
from the composite flood frequency curve at Cologne. Next,
the flood type was randomly chosen according to the like-
lihood of the flood types identified by the cluster analysis
(cf. Table 2). From discharge and flood type, a flood wave
was constructed and then routed to the final gauge at Rees,
with tests for levee breaches at Krefeld and Mehrum. The
discharge was increased by discharges from the tributaries
Ruhr and Lippe, which were calculated on the basis of the
main river – tributary regressions shown in Fig. 5. In order
to simulate the correlations between the main and tributary
discharges, the tributary discharge was randomised for any
given main river discharge assuming a normal distribution
with mean values calculated from the regression equations
and standard deviations calculated from Eq. (5):
σtrib cor = σtrib
√
1− ρ2i (Cullen and Frey, 1999) (5)
where ρi denotes the correlation coefficients. The ran-
domised tributary discharges were adjusted to base flow
in case the randomised discharges were smaller than base
flow. Using this procedure it was possible to represent both
the functional relationships between main and tributary dis-
charges as expressed in the regression equation and the vari-
ability in the relationship as expressed in the correlation co-
efficients. By this procedure the exposure of the polder
Mehrum to flooding was quantified.
In a next step the vulnerability of the target area as ex-
pressed by the damage curve (Fig. 6) was combined with
the exposure in order to assess the flood risk. By this pro-
cedure floods with an associated probability of occurrence
were transformed into direct property damage. By repeat-
ing this procedure 105 times, the distribution function of in-
put discharge at Cologne was transformed into a distribution
function of property damage at the polder at Mehrum. This
distribution was plotted as a risk curve which represents the
exceedance probability of events expressed in return intervals
associated with a damage exceeding a given level. Figure 7
gives a schematic of the procedure.
3.2 Uncertainty analysis
To account for the uncertainties of the spatial breach de-
velopment (Sect. 2.3), the procedure described above was
performed for four different breach width scenarios termed
K100, K200, K300 and K400 with breach widths of 100 to
400 m at Krefeld, combined with three scenarios setting the
turf quality parameter fg to 0.7, 1.05 and 1.4, respectively.
The breach width scenarios are defined in accordance of ex-
pert knowledge of the governmental authorities responsible
for the construction and care of the levee systems. Accord-
ing to their assessment 100 to 400 m is the range of widths to
be expected in case of levee breaches at the lower Rhine. The
range of fg is consistent with that given in Vrijling (2000),
who quantified “poor” turf quality with 0.7 and “good” with
1.4. The quantification is based on studies of Hewlett et
al. (1987). In addition to the breach scenarios, a scenario
without a breach at Krefeld, K0, was defined in order to fully
assess the effect of upstream breaches on the risk at Mehrum.
For all scenarios, the same set of randomised maximum dis-
charges and flood types for the main river Rhine and the trib-
utaries was used in order to isolate the effect of breach widths
at Krefeld on the failure probabilities at Mehrum.
In each scenario we estimated uncertainty distributions
for selected return intervals by a 2nd level of Monte Carlo
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Fig. 8. Empirical uncertainty distributions of discharge for different
return intervals T as used in the uncertainty analysis.
simulations, randomising the discharge given by the four dis-
tribution functions for the defined return intervals, the stage
discharge relationship at the potential levee failure sites and
using the conditional levee failure probabilities derived in
Sect. 2.3 (cf. Table 1). For randomising the discharge given
by the four distributions the following procedure was used:
1. First, confidence intervals for each of the distribution
functions were calculated from which standard devi-
ations were derived for each selected return interval
(Maidment, 1992; Plate, 1993b).
2. A set of 104 discharge values were randomly chosen
from the distributions for every selected return interval
T assuming a standard distribution with values of the
composite distribution as mean and standard deviations
as calculated in point 1. The number of samples per dis-
tribution were set according to the distribution weights
(cf. Sect. 2.1).
3. From this set of discharges empirical cumulated proba-
bilities were calculated.
4. Based on the empirical cumulated probabilities of dis-
charges for each return interval T the samples for the
uncertainty distributions were drawn.
Figure 8 shows the empirical distributions derived by this
method for different return intervals T . The figure clearly
shows that at large return intervals the spread of the uncer-
tainty distribution is large indicating that the four distribu-
tion functions of the AMS give markedly different values (cf.
Fig. 2).
The procedure for the stage-discharge-relationship was
similar. First, confidence intervals for the three parameter
estimates of the polynomial function representing the stage-
discharge-relationship were calculated. For the randomisa-
tion a normal distribution was assumed with the mean equal
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Fig. 9. Frequency curves at the outlet of the investigation area (Rees
at the Rhine): scenarios of different breach widths, fg= 1.05.
to that of the parameter estimates and the variance taken from
the confidence intervals.
In order to reduce CPU-time, a Latin Hypercube sampling
scheme with 40 equally spaced intervals and median interval
selection was applied for every selected return interval T in
this calculation. From the uncertainty distributions, a 95%
confidence interval was calculated for every T .
4 Results
4.1 Risk analysis
The results of the 1st level of Monte Carlo simulations for
the 12 scenarios are summarised in Table 4. Without any
upstream breaches (K0), the levee at Mehrum failed up to
99 times (failure rate 0.99‰) in the Monte Carlo simula-
tions. When breaches at Krefeld were allowed, this figure
was significantly reduced to only one failure of the levee at
Mehrum in the case of a breach width of 400 m at Krefeld
irrespective of the value of the turf parameter fg (Table 4).
In addition to the breach width at Krefeld, the turf quality has
an important effect on the number of breaches. The lower is
the turf quality the higher is the number of breaches at both
locations.
The flood frequency curve at Rees, the most downstream
gauging station of the reach examined here (Fig. 1), is also
influenced by the number of upstream levee breaches and
the breach width at Krefeld. Figure 9 shows the flood fre-
quency curves at Rees derived from the output of the routing
module for a fixed turf quality and varying breach widths
at Krefeld. The return intervals associated with discharges
larger than the critical discharge required for levee breaches
change as a function of the breach width. Overall, the ex-
ceedance probabilities of extreme events are reduced by up-
stream levee breaches while the exceedance probabilities of
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Table 4. Number of levee breaches in 105 simulations for the 12 breach width – turf quality scenario combinations. The left value for each
scenario gives the number of model runs with breaches, the right values give the breaches at Krefeld (top) and Mehrum (bottom), respectively.
Scenario K0 K100 K200 K300 K400
Breach width at Krefeld (m) No breach 100 200 300 400
Turf 0.7 99 — 173 173 173 173 174 174 174 174
parameter 99 41 19 7 1
fg 1.05 92 — 160 160 160 160 160 160 161 161
92 36 18 6 1
1.4 87 — 151 151 150 150 152 152 151 151
87 35 15 6 1
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Fig. 10. Effect of varying the turf parameter, fg, on the flood fre-
quency curve at Rees for the 4 breach scenarios. From top to bottom
fg was set to 0.7, 1.05 and 1.4.
discharges at the critical levels are increased. This effect is
caused by the reduction of the peak flows of a number of
floods that overtop the levee to discharges below the critical
overflowing discharge. The effect is more pronounced the
wider the breach at Krefeld is assumed.
The variation of the turf quality changes the shape of the
frequency curves in a different way. Varying the turf pa-
rameters changes the critical discharge required for levee
breaches which in turn changes the return intervals for dis-
charges larger than the critical discharge. The effect is appar-
ent in Fig. 10. This figure indicates that the return interval of
the critical discharge for levee breaches at Krefeld varies be-
tween T=550 years to T=650 years within the turf quality
scenarios.
The risk curve for Mehrum was constructed from the cal-
culated inflow volume of the polder for the different scenar-
ios. The expected damage for each breach event was calcu-
lated from the damage curve (Fig. 6) and the maximum in-
flow volume of the breach events. By this procedure, the risk
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Fig. 11. Risk curves for the polder Mehrum, scenarios with different
breach widths; fg=1.05.
curves for the polder at Mehrum shown in Fig. 11 were de-
rived. The step-like trajectories of the risk curves are a result
of the presence of the flood protection system as the dam-
ages only occur for discharges equal to or in excess of dis-
charges causing levee failure. For breach widths at Krefeld
larger than 300 m, the risk of damage at Mehrum is zero up
to a return interval of 104 years which is a result of the high
retention capacity of the upstream polder. This, again, em-
phasises the key role of upstream levee failures for the flood
risk downstream.
4.2 Uncertainty analysis
The uncertainty analysis performed by the 2nd level of
Monte Carlo simulations yielded confidence bounds for each
scenario. As an example, the annual maximum discharge
frequency curve at Rees for the breach scenarios with fg set
to 1.05 are shown in Fig. 12. All sources of epistemic un-
certainty as shown in bold in Table 1 are included, the type
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Fig. 12. Uncertainty in the exceedance probability of annual max-
imum discharges at Rees caused by the distribution function type
and the stage-discharge-relationship for the 4 breach scenarios. fg
was set to 1.05.
of the extreme value distribution functions, the parameter
estimates for the stage-discharge-relationship and the levee
geometry error. Figure 12 suggests that, for large events, the
uncertainty decreases with the width of the breach at Krefeld.
This is due to the large breach outflow combined with the
almost infinite retention capacity of the polder at Krefeld.
Most of the randomised discharges of the uncertainty distri-
butions that produce a levee breach are reduced to the level
of the levee base in the case of a 400 m breach, resulting in
the upper confidence bound approaching the frequency curve
(Fig. 12) at the level of the critical breach discharge.
The risk curves associated with the flood frequency curves
in Fig. 12 are shown in Fig. 13. It shows that the uncertainty
in damage is hardly reduced by the breach width which is
in contrast to the results of the flood frequency curve. The
uncertainty bounds (dashed lines in Fig. 13) cover a wide
range from zero damage to almost maximum damage above
return intervals larger than about 200 years.
In Fig. 14 two epistemic uncertainty sources are examined
independently. It shows that the uncertainty introduced by
the parameter estimation of the stage-discharge-relationship
is rather small in comparison with as compared to the over-
all uncertainty. The uncertainty caused by the type of the
distribution function alone is almost identical to the over-
all uncertainty. If the two sources are combined, the un-
certainty caused by the stage-discharge-relationship is com-
pletely clouded by the uncertainty caused by the distribution
function type. In line with this result, the uncertainty in the
stage-discharge-relationship has almost no effect on the risk
curves at Mehrum (not shown here).
The presented results indicate that the uncertainty of the
risk assessment is enormous. This is caused by two facts:
Fig. 13. Exceedance probability of damage at the polder at Mehrum
(solid lines) and associated uncertainty (dashed lines) caused by
distribution function type and stage-discharge-relationship for the
K100 and K200 breach scenarios. fg was set to 1.05. The points
show the Monte Carlo realisations.
1. the large magnitude and duration of floods required to
cause levee failures,
2. the comparatively large uncertainty in the extreme value
statistics for the annual maximum discharges with re-
turn intervals > 200 years (cf. Fig. 2).
The combination of these two facts results in uncertainty dis-
tributions that are almost binary. For floods associated with
return intervals > 200 years either levee failures producing
very high damages can occur, or if the levees happen to re-
sist the flood, the polder is protected from any damage (see
plot of uncertainty distribution points in Fig. 13). The con-
fidence intervals calculated from these uncertainty distribu-
tions are consequently enormous. For return intervals as high
as 104 years it is possible that the levee resists the flood and
protects the polder or it fails and causes disastrous damages.
This enormous uncertainty is only attributed to the uncer-
tainty in the annual maximum discharge.
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Fig. 14. Flood frequency curve for Rees showing the effect of the
two epistemic uncertainty sources extreme value statistics distribu-
tion type and stage-discharge-relation (HQ−relation) for scenario
K300. fg was set to 1.05.
5 Discussion and conclusion
The proposed model allows us to perform a quantitative
flood risk analysis including the effect of levee failures along
with the associated uncertainty. Because of the simple struc-
ture of the model proposed here, a large number of Monte
Carlo-simulations can be performed in a reasonable time
which cover a wide variety of flood events. The approach is
therefore very well suited to integrated flood risk assessment.
Risk assessment (aleatory uncertainty)
The results obtained here suggest that, in the study
reach, upstream levee failures significantly affect the failure
probability downstream and, hence the risk curve of the
target area. The simulations also illustrate the effect of the
retention volume of a polder. Because of the very large
retention capacity of the hinterland at Krefeld, the levee
failure probability at Mehrum is significantly reduced and
the flood frequency curve at Rees is attenuated if levee
failures at Krefeld are allowed. The size of the polder at
Mehrum controls the shape of the flood risk curve. The
step-like shape of the risk curve results from the small
volume of the polder at Mehrum and the high magnitude
of the events overtopping the levee. However, in case of
upstream breach widths larger than 300 m at Krefeld the risk
equals zero for return intervals up to 104 years. Taking the
zero breach scenario at Krefeld as the worst case scenario for
the target area, the results indicate that the flood protection
structures at Mehrum are sufficient to resist floods up to
return intervals of >1000 years, if the uncertainty of the
results is neglected.
Uncertainty analysis (epistemic uncertainty)
The model also allows the analysis of various sources
of epistemic uncertainty including the flood frequency
statistics (annual maximum series) and the spatial breach
development. By applying 2nd-order Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, confidence bounds were derived for the flood
frequency curves at the outlet of the study reach as well as
for the risk curves of the polder at Mehrum. Due to the large
uncertainty caused by the epistemic uncertainty sources the
statement that the flood protection structures at Mehrum are
sufficient to protect the area from a 1000-year flood has to be
corrected. From the uncertainty bounds of the zero breach
scenario, being he worst case for the polder Mehrum, and
the 100 and 200 m breach width scenarios shown in Fig. 13
it can be concluded that the flood protection structures
are likely to protect from floods with return intervals of
less than 200 years. For larger floods, the uncertainty is
mainly attributed to the extreme value statistics of the annual
maximum discharge and yields that both complete failure
and no failure may occur producing a range of possible
damage from zero to maximum damage.
We also examined the sources of epistemic uncertainty in-
dividually. The results suggest that a more reliable extreme
value statistics is crucially important for reducing the uncer-
tainty of the risk assessment. A major prerequisite for that
are longer time series of annual maximum discharges. The
used series of 35 years is clearly too short to obtain reliable
risk assessments of events with associated return intervals of
more the 200 years. In contrast to the extreme value statistics
the stage-discharge-relationships proved to be relatively less
important in the uncertainty analysis. From this finding it
can be reasoned that the neglected uncertainty sources of Ta-
ble 1 have also little influence on the uncertainty analysis as
long as the uncertainty caused by the extreme value statistics
cannot be reduced significantly. Uncertainties of the rout-
ing module or the HQ−relation simply cannot cause such a
variation in the modelling results, especially not at a rather
uniform low-land stream the the Lower Rhine. Solely the
uncertainties in the damage estimation are expected to cause
a significant change in the risk curve. However, being the
last module of the modelling system, which doesn’t influence
the probability of flooding, it would only alter the maximum
damage caused by floods. The characteristic shape of the risk
curves and the associated return intervals remain unchanged.
In contrast to this the uncertainties associated with the
breach module still remain large. Better knowledge about the
breach development and the distribution of the turf quality on
natural levee systems would most likely reduce this unknown
component of uncertainty in the risk assessment. A study in-
vestigating the levee breaches during the August 2002 flood
of the Elbe adressing this issue has been started. With these
data we hope to extend the levee failure module from re-
cently built levees to older flood defence structures and to
get more information of spatial breach development. The un-
certainty of damage estimation will also be refined by using
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data gathered in the aftermath of the August 2002 flood. Ad-
ditionally, a continuous test for levee breaches along the river
course should be incorporated in the system in order to gener-
ate more realistic estimates of the influence of levee breaches
on flood risks.
Due to its modular structure and the universal nature of
the methods used here, the proposed model system should
be transferable to other river systems provided the required
data sets are available. In addition, single parts of the model
system may be applied independently, e.g. to investigate the
probability of levee failure at a given location. It is therefore
believed that the system may be profitably used for a number
of additional purposes, e.g. as a tool for cost-benefit analy-
sis of flood protection measures, and as a decision support
system for operational flood control. Another possible appli-
cation is the flood management and control during a severe
flood for which estimates of the effects of upstream levee
breaches on the shape and propagation of the flood wave and
thus on inundation risks at the reaches downstream may be
useful. Real time simulations of such scenarios could facil-
itate the emergency management and enhance the efficiency
of planned levee failures or weir openings. However, a pre-
requisite for these applications is an accurate calibration of
the model system to a given reach. Clearly, this needs to be
done prior to a severe flood event. This implies that, ideally,
the flood management system should be applicable to both
long-term planning tasks and operational decision support.
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